The European agricultural market has been criticized for its heavy regulations and subsidization. The sugar market is one of the most regulated ones; however, this will change radically in 2017 when the current system of production quotas will end. The aim of this paper is to present the basic characteristics of the EU quota sugar market. The analysis identifi es the main drivers of EU sugar market and their position within the EU sugar market. The paper identifi es especially those drivers/ companies/alliances which take control over the EU sugar production realized under the quota production system. The paper also highlights the level of EU sugar market concentration and also identifi es those countries and companies which are the main leaders in the sugar production area realized under the quota system. Based on the results deriving from the paper, it is possible to characterize the EU sugar market as a heavily concentrated one -nearly 75% (10 mil. tonnes) of the quota is controlled by fi ve multinational companies only; these companies are operating more than 50% of all the available sugar plants located in the EU. These multinational alliances are also in control of the production capacities of their subsidiaries. In most countries, this causes serious problems as the given quota is controlled by one or two producers only. The EU sugar market is extremely concentrated especially if we take into consideration the location of each alliance's headquarters. The majority of production capacities are under (the) control of especially German and French companies. These two countries are also the main benefi ciaries in relation to the EU sugar production quota system.
INTRODUCTION
Agriculture represents a regulated sector in many countries including the EU members. The EU agricultural policy represents a very powerful instrument protecting its farmers and foodstuff producers (Spettman, 2006) . The Common agricultural policy made EU a signifi cant food producer and the most signifi cant food exporter in the world (Krick, 2000) . EU countries in the past established a signifi cantly higher number of special policies supporting selected sectors within the EU agriculture. The most specifi c CMO was applied for example in relation to cereals, milk and sugar, etc. However, the applied policy strengthened the position of EU farmers and fi xed the EU agricultural and foodstuff market, its side eff ect being distortion of the EU market character both in relation to the EU single market and also in relation to the world market (Richardson, 2009) . A very nice example of such distortion can be seen for example in relation to the EU sugar market. Its production capacities are heavily regulated by both the applied production quota system and import protection (Judzinška and Kovačevic, 2012) . In the past, the applied Common sugar market organization made the EU sugar market an isolated island existing within the world sugar market. The EU was heavily criticized because of its sugar policy especially by developing countries and WTO authorities. The long term critique together with the process of EU agricultural policy transformation made EU countries carry out several gradual reforms aff ecting the EU agriculture policy, structure and character (Budzynska, 2013) . These changes also aff ected the EU sugar market -which has become very concentrated during the last several decades (Féménia and Gohin, 2013) . Currently, the problem of EU sugar market future development is being strongly discussed especially in connection with the expected abolition of the sugar quota system. The future character of the EU sugar market is not really clear. The EU sugar market has already been working under CMO for a rather long time and its ability to face the world is questionable.
The Common Market Organisation (CMO) for sugar has been one of the pillars of the Common Agricultural Policy since its establishment. In comparison with other agricultural sectors, CMO for sugar was not considered as a big political problem (Bureau et al., 1997) even though 80% of the world sugar production was connected with some kind of support (Mitchell, 2005) . The original sugar policy used two instruments: price guarantees for sugar producers within the EU together with import restrictions from the third countries (Fransen et al., 2003) . By combining the previous instruments with levies, the price exceeded the world market price (Bogeto et al., 2007; Elobeid and Beghin, 2006) . This could guarantee the original aim that is to ensure income for EU growers and assure as well as EU's self-suffi ciency. This situation also has had budgetary consequences. Since sugar is by far the most subsidized commodity in the world, a similar situation has appeared in other countries as well (Beghin and Elobeid, 2015) .
The Common Market Organisation for sugar has been based on the quota system. Pinkerton and Edwards (2010) mention that in order for a quota market to function well, a number of conditions must exist, otherwise market imperfections might occur (Williams and Isham, 1999) .
Since its creation until 2005, CMO for sugar remained mostly unchanged (Ackrill and Kay, 2009; Šustrová, 2014) . Van Meijl and van Tongeren (2002) point out that lowering import protection for other agricultural products may have led to the rise of sugar supply.
The fi rst substantial sugar reform is connected with the Council regulation (EC) No. 318/2006. It brought a signifi cant intervention price reduction for sugar and sugar beet, merging of the quotas and incentives to reduce production (European Commission, 2006) . Although some authors (Buysse et al., 2007) mention that additional actions would be necessary, the introduced measures caused the closure of 83 sugar factories and resulted in 22,000 direct and more than 100,000 indirect job losses (EFFAT, 2013) .
Many authors (Abler et al., 2007; Řezbová et al., 2013) mention the negative impact on the producers; however, in general it was agreed that the reform should have resulted in welfare gains for the EU (Gohin and Bureau, 2006; Špička and Janotová, 2013) as well as for other states (Koo, 2002; Svatoš et al., 2012; Nolte et al., 2010 ). An analysis showed that for the least developed countries (LDC's) or African, Caribbean and Pacifi c (ACP) countries the EU has remained the most profi table export market. On the other hand, Richardson-Ngwenya and Richardson (2014) emphasize that the benefi ts may be overwhelmed by the ongoing liberalization process.
Another signifi cant change to CMO for sugar is abolition of the quota system that will take place. A number of models show that the quota abolition will increase the EU's production from 13.3 to 15.5 m tonnes . The quota management will end as of 30 September 2017 (European Commission, 2015 .
Several decades of application of CMO concerning the sugar market resulted in a constantly decreasing number of sugar plants operating on the EU market. Because of CMO, the profi le of the EU sugar market has become very limited and the process of re-structuralization has survived only in about 100 sugar beet plants spread in circa 19 EU countries. These plants are operated by only a few international alliances and the number of independent sugar plants is constantly decreasing and, year by year, a couple of independent plants collapse.
Higher market concentration was the result of CMO reforms including the reform from 2006. Each sugar market reform made the production and the market more eff ective and forced the less eff ective companies to leave it. However, this kind of decision lead to some kind of market ineffi ciency or even market imperfection (reduction of the level of competitiveness -the market became highly concentrated especially in several EU countries). This is intensifi ed by another problem -the existence of the sugar quota. Imperfect competition leads to the increase of returns and thus to higher profi tability of the producers operating under the quota system. The aim of this paper is to present the basic characteristics of the EU quota sugar market. The analysis identifi es the main drivers of the EU sugar market and their position within the EU sugar market. The paper identifi es especially those drivers/companies/alliances which take control over the EU sugar production realized under the quota production system. The paper also highlights the level of the EU sugar market concentration and it also identifi es those countries and companies which are the main leaders in the sugar production area realized under the quota system.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The paper is divided into two parts. The fi rst part of paper focuses on description of the sugar market in the European Union with regards to production, consumption and trade. The second part is related to the market structure. The ownership structure of sugar factories and refi neries is analysed. Our approach focuses on the relationship between diff erent factories and their owners. We assume that though there is a considerable number of producing capacities, the structure of the market will not be too fragmented as a result, and only a limited number of key companies will take control of it.
In order to conduct the analysis, data from the F.O. Licht database have been used that help to describe the ownership structure of current sugar producers. Graphical decomposition is used to examine all the relations between diff erent factors. The analysed data cover the period of the last fi ve years (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . The aim is to analyse the situation a er the world economic crisis (2009). The data cover the following areas: sugar production, trade, consumption, prices, stocks, daily production capacities, sugar quotas and their distribution, companies operating within the EU market and their ownership structure. In order to analyse the level of concentration of quota sugar production capacities -the proposed methodology identifi es the real power and the position of the countries and fi rms operating under the EU sugar CMO, that is under the production quota system.
The degree of concentration of production capacities (under the quota system) is measured by the CR 5 concentration index (CR n ) and Herfi ndahlHirschman Index (HHI):
where Si is the quota share of a fi rm i, n represent the number of surveyed subjects within a given sector. The share of fi rms/alliances was expressed as their partial share in the quota beet sugar production. Classifi cation of the CR n index given by the DG Comp (2007) results in three categories: a) Low concentration (0-50%) -from perfect competitiveness to oligopoly. b) Moderate concentration (50-80%) -pure oligopoly. c) High concentration (80-100%) from oligopoly to monopoly. "HHI" is applied as an additional indicator to the CRn. HHI is used to measure quota holder system concentration and to monitor antimonopoly policies. The index ranges from 0 (no concentration and a highly competitive system) to 10,000 (pure monopoly) (Hirschman, 1964) . The index is calculated by squaring the quota share of each fi rm competing in the quota system and adding the resulting numbers together:
where s i is the quota share of the fi rm/alliance "i" in the quota system and N represents the number of fi rms/alliances on the market. This article uses HHI classifi cation defi ned by the US Department of Justice. If HHI is lower than 0.01 (or 100), the market (quota system) is highly competitive. HHI ranging from 0.01 and 0.15 (100 and 1,500 respectively) indicates an unconcentrated market (quota system) with signifi cant positions of several companies. The values of HHI from 0.15 to 0.25 (1,500 and 2,500 respectively) reveal signifi cant market (quota system) concentration (mostly monopolistic competition) and HHI above 0.25 (2,500) indicates a highly concentrated market (mostly oligopoly). HHI close to 1 (10,000) suggests a monopoly. The level of concentration of EU sugar quota production is also illustrated using a modifi ed "Lorenz curve". Originally, the Lorenz curve was a tool used to represent income distributions as proposed by Lorenz (Lorenz, 1905) . However, for our purposes the Lorenz Curve is modifi ed as follows. The x-axis records the cumulative proportion of the number of sugar market subjects (sugar companies or alliances) ranked by their "daily sugar production capacities". The share of companies in the total number of companies is in percentage. The y-axis records the cumulative proportion of "daily production capacities of sugar factories" for a given proportion (number) of sugar companies/alliances. The y-axis also provides the results in percentage.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

EU Sugar Market Character
The European Union sugar market has been operating under very special circumstances. It is isolated by the application of the EU CAP and trade policy from a direct infl uence of the world market. The production quotas together with (applied) import restrictions made EU a "sugar island". While the world sugar market is developing fast, the EU sugar production has been stagnating. Annual sugar production across the world is higher than its consumption. In the production year 2014/2015, the world production was 182 mil. tonnes and consumption 176 mil. tonnes. The surplus was 6 mil. tonnes. During the last four decades, production of sugar has more than tripled. On the other hand, EU sugar production within the last four decades has recorded mere 25% growth and since the 1990s the production capacities installed in EU countries have been decreasing.
The following Tab. I provides basic information about the structure of production, consumption and sugar trade during the last 5 years. It is evident that the production itself is oscillating between 16 mil. tonnes and 20 mil. tonnes. However, the EU sugar market is heavily protected and the production volume is stabilized. The European Union is considered to be the net sugar importerthis is especially true regarding raw sugar, however, concerning white sugar, EU is still the net exporter (however, it is necessary to highlight that despite the fact that the EU is a net sugar importer, it is also an extremely developed net exporter of sweeteners. If we also take into consideration sugar included in sweeteners, the EU sugar trade can possibly be characterized by positive balance.). The following Tab. II provides a basic overview of EU trade activities development in connection with raw and white sugar. Based on the data available, it is evident that the volume of EU sugar export has recorded a signifi cant decline during the last 5 years.
During the last year, all sugar-processing companies announced a drop in their turnover and profi t.
During the last few years, the share of beet sugar has declined compared to cane sugar, production of which has increased. In general, there are two factors infl uencing the current production. Firstly, it is increasing acreage and, secondly, increasing yields. These two factors have an impact on the price that has reached its minimum for the last years (Fig. 1) (1. 7. 2010-1. 3. 2015) Source: own processing based on F. O. Licht, 2015 are in nowadays heavily aff ected by increasing competition from ACP countries (operating within the EU market under the GSP regime) and their trade activities are also negatively infl uenced by constantly increasing supply of low caloric and dieteticall sweeteners e.g. isoglucose. The constantly increasing competition is reducing the level of sugar price not only at the global level, but also at the level of the European Union -for details see Fig. 1 . In nowadays many production facilities operating within the EU market are surviving only because of CMO. The quota system provides their holders the privilege to operate within the EU market, which is still protected against the import from many third countries. Sugar beet capacities are mostly connected with the former colonial power (such as the UK). The European Union is considered a very important actor on the world sugar market. It is one of the most important producers as well as consumers.
The Tab. I also points to another problem, which is the high ending stock. These huge sugar inventories cause problems with gradual market liberalization. They could also jeopardize the system a er the quota abolition. The European Union cannot increase its export because of the WTO volume regulation.
The European sugar market is very specifi c and connected with protectionism. The sugar quota presents a typical example of a government regulatory mechanism to promote the original objectives of the CMO for sugar. The production quota reduces the quantity of production and, consequently, the surplus of domestic consumers through higher domestic prices. This means that the deadweight loss occurs which could be referred to as a reduction of the net benefi t (Fig. 2) . On the other hand, the market is distorted. As has been mentioned, having a quota is some kind of a privilege for those operating within the EU market. This privilege is extremely profi table for current quota holders, but it is not so profi table for consumers.
The problem is that this kind of protection is not universal but limited only to the producers or rather to the quota holders, that is, very o en, multinational corporations. By abolishing the sugar quota, we can expect the price to fall. We witnessed the same situation in 2006 when the European Union presented the fi rst changes to the market organization for sugar. An intervention price was replaced by reference sugar prices and was reduced by 36%. The quota system changed (A and B quotas were put together into one group -called 'quota' only). At the same time, a payment to companies willing to give up quotas was introduced. However, this action resulted in the current situation when small players have already le the market, and it is dominated by only a few key players. The problem of the current quota regime and its possible abolition is the fact that independent producers will not be able to survive the competition immediately a er the elimination of the quota system. The experience was analogous in 2015 immediately a er the milk quota system was abolished.
Production Capacities Distribution Under EU Sugar Quota System
In comparison with the rest of the world, more than ¾ of European sugar-processing factories can process only in sugar beet. Some of them can process sugar cane only (10%) and the rest (approximately 12%) are combined factories. Tab. III demonstrates the structure of processing capacities across the European Union. It is evident that concentration of sugar factories in all member states varies. Concerning the old member states, only Ireland and Luxembourg do not have any sugar 2: Production quota Source: own processing, 2015 factories. The highest number of sugar factories is located in Germany and France. In regard to the new member states, there is no processing capacity in Estonia, Latvia, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia. Poland is the biggest producer of the new member states. Poland together with France and Germany account for nearly 50% of the sugar processing factories. However, we can conclude that there is no statistically signifi cant diff erence between the total number of sugar processing factories (including sugar beet factories + combined factories + sugar cane processing factories) in either old or new member states (p value ≥ 0.05).
During the last few years, there have been approximately between 50 and 60 companies operating across the European Union (one company could operate more than one sugar plant). The number of companies diff ers across the member states (Tab. IV) and across years as well. As is evident from Tab. III and Tab. IV, the market shows enormous potential. The high number of companies should be regarded as positive and should indicate a competitive environment. However, the reality is diff erent. What is not evident is the inner structure of the market. Most of these companies are closely related through multinational alliances or other agreements. Individual alliances are then controlling many production facilities spread all over the Europe (In practise there are only about 21 independent players operating under the quota regime). Those multinational alliances following their aim and ambitions and in many cases they already made a decision having the fatal impact on individual national sugar production capacities.
It is evident from Fig. 3 that only few companies control the whole sugar market. It might be stated that the following alliances are the market leaders: Suedzucker, Nordzucker, Tereos Group, Pfeifer & Langen, Cristal Union, Associated British Food Alliance and Tate & Lyle.
The following Fig. 4 provides the overview of EU production sugar quotas distribution among 21 alliances and independent companies controlling nearly hundred sugar plants operating under the quota regime (quota owners). On the base of results coming from Fig. 4 , it is evident that EU market is heavily concentrated -cc 70% of sugar producers control only about 10.5% sugar quota volume. On the other hand cc 7 biggest alliances have taking control nearly over 90% of production quota volume.
The following Fig. 5 provides the overview of top 10 producers according to their share in sugar quota production volume.
Suedzucker Source: own processing based on F. O. Licht, 2015 Note: The number in brackets represents the number of factories owned by the company Greece -only 1 factory is taken into consideration -the rest are not operating, this also applies to Sermide S.p.A. I (Italy) and SC Zaharul Liesti S. A. (Romania) Belgium, France, Poland, Austria, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Suedzucker has 18.5 thousand employees and an annual turnover of €7.7 billion €. Farmers constitute 55% of its shareholders. In the 2013/2014 campaign, they processed 27 m tonnes of sugar beet and produced 4.7 m tonnes of sugar. Nordzucker is the 2 nd largest sugar producer in the EU. Its market share is 15% (Fig. 5) . This alliance is operating in Poland, Slovakia, Finland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Lithuania, and Sweden. In total, this alliance has a daily production capacity of 148,627 t/day for raw sugar. In 2014, they produced 2.9 m tonnes of sugar from sugar beet in 13 plants.
The third largest company is Tereos with an 11% market share. Tereos operates in France, Spain, Romania and the Czech Republic. It is followed by Associated British Food (ABF) with the same market share, connected with Spain and the United Kingdom.
The last company belonging to the "big fi ve" according to CRn is Pfeifer & Langen. Its market share is 8%. Pfeifer & Langen operate in Germany, Poland and Romania. Fig. 6 shows the structure of the quota holders in the European Union. There are 8 big companies that own the majority of the quota and thus can control the market.
The European sugar market is represented by horizontal as well as vertical mergers. Through the horizontal mergers, most of factories have been connected together to create sugar alliances. The vertical merger then represents a connection between diff erent stages of production. As an example, we can use the Tereos group that has 3: Structure of the sugar producers in the EU Source: own processing based on F. O. Licht, 2015 Note: if the share is not mentioned in percentage, it is 100% been considered the 3 rd largest sugar producer in the world. This company is based on cooperative principles and apart from sugar beet factories, it also includes sugar cane/beet grower organizations or, on the other hand, a distillery, a bioethanol plant, liquid and special sugar refi neries, a starch production plant or even a packing centre.
It is also important to mention the international dimension of the above-mentioned companies.
They do not operate in Europe only, but also expand into Latin America, Africa or China. Therefore, they could be referred to as global multinational corporations. As an example, we can use Tereos that operates in Latin America, or the Associated British Food Alliance which expanded into South Africa (51% of shares in Illovo -a major sugar company) or China (China also is the second biggest importer of raw sugar -however, its self-suffi ciency Cummulative share of daily production cappacities cummulative proportion of the number of sugar market subject
The share of companies in total number of companies operating within the EU quota sugar market is increasing. The second part is the infl uence of foreign companies on traditionally European sugar producers and processers. This strategy is mostly connected with sugar cane production. As the quota should be abolished in 2017, the European market will become more interesting for investors from outside the EU. Many foreign companies have bought shares in traditionally European companies (American Sugar Refi ning has taken over 50% of SFIR Raffi neria di Brindisi in Italy. This company also owns Tate & Lyle Sugars.). The current development can radically change the structure of the European sugar market. Recently, the EU has become the 7 th biggest importer of raw sugar. This sugar is primarily imported from African -Caribbean -Pacifi c countries (ACP) or the least developed countries (LDC's) with preferential access to the market (Economic Partnership Agreement -EPA). This import is dutyfree and it is not included in the quota. Another possible source of sugar import is the Free Trade Agreement with Latin American countries.
4: The level of concentration of EU sugar quotas production capacities
The Level of EU Sugar Quota System Production Volume Concentration
HHI leads to the statement that there is no reasonably competitive environment in any member state. Only a limited number of companies/ alliances operate in the sugar beet quota system in EU-countries. France, Germany, Poland, Czech Republic and Romania, where the number of operating subjects is higher, are certain exceptions; nevertheless, these are also highly concentrated due to a high share of sugar quota leaders. In the Czech Republic, the sugar quota system is operated by seven sugar factories that are under control of fi ve companies. From this perspective, the Czech sugar quota system is one of the least concentrated.
When examining the European quota beet sugar holder system, a paradox will appear. While the quota holder system of individual EU-Member States is highly concentrated, the EU-quota holder system as a whole seem to be relatively low concentrated. The HHI of the quota holders operating on the single market reaches 0.1444, that is 1,444. The HHI refl ecting the quota distribution according to national allocation indicates a low level of concentration as well: 0.13648, that is 1,364.8. When applying HHI methodology to the EU-quota holder system and assigning quotas controlled by companies/alliances to individual countries according to company headquarters, a strong concentrated quota holder system at the oligopoly level will result. The data show signifi cant discrepancy between political eff orts to distribute equitable sugar quotas among states and 6: Quota holders in the European Union Source: own processing based on F. O. Licht, 2015 the reality. While the EU-quota holder system does not indicate extreme concentration (HHI 1,364.8; an unconcentrated system), the analysis according to the headquarters' location and quotas allocated to the owners of production capacities indicates that the quota holder system will appear extremely concentrated (HHI 3, 222; oligopoly) . When performing the analysis over the last twenty or thirty years, it will be evident that the sugar quota holder system in the EU is becoming constantly more and more concentrated.
The high level of concentration of the EU sugar production quota market is also proved using the CR 5 index. Only fi ve companies control almost 70% of the production quota -for details, please see Fig. 5 . These four companies (Suedzucker, Nordzucker, Tereos, ABF and Pfeifer Langen) and their production capacities represent the key pillar of EU quota sugar production. A er the CR 5 index methodology is applied, the EU quota sugar market can be characterized as highly concentrated with a signifi cant oligopolistic character.
It is the oligopolistic character of the EU sugar market which might result in some possible cartel agreement among the main market leaders. An analogous problem was already recorded in the past (McGowan, 2005 
CONCLUSION
Our results indicate that the current European sugar market with its quota system is oligopolistic and highly concentrated. There is a limited number of companies that control most of the market with this very homogeneous product. This system is even worse due to the quota distribution. Majority of the sugar processing capacities are controlled by multinational corporations. However, the question remains whether the quota abolition will have the expected outcome as most of the competitors have already le the market. The 2006 Sugar reform brought signifi cant changes to the European sugar market. We have witnessed a decline in the production in connection with the change of the position of the EU on the international market. Regarding white sugar, we are now the net importers rather than exporters. All the measures have led to higher market concentration together with more eff ective production. However, market concentration also means narrow connection between the key players on the market. As it is evident from the previous text, only a small number of fi rms control the homogeneous sugar market. Our fi ndings correspond with the results of McCorriston (2002) who suggests that food market in Europe is typically oligopolistic. Lopez and Bhuyan (1998) suggest that a market with more frequent and low cost products is more diffi cult for the consumer to be organized at, and the producers can increase their oligopolistic power. The companies altogether are highly integrated, which corresponds with the fi ndings of Moss and Schmitz (2002) regarding the US market. The quota abolition should lead to an increase in EU sugar production together with the price decline, thus we can expect a welfare gain. However, Bouamra-Mechemache et al. (2001) point out that, with regard to the abolition, it is also necessary to liberalize trade; otherwise the quota removal will not have the desired eff ect. Consequently, this will lead to an increase in sugar consumption. According to the International Sugar Organization, the annual growth of consumption is 1% per year. Another question that has arisen is whether another increase in consumption is desirable owing to health problems connected with it. A similar situation has already occurred. The quota system in the European sugar market represents a typical kind of economic regulation which restricts availability of a product. We can consider it as preference of several selected groups or producers. Unfortunately, this type of "government support" is intended for the large sugar producers located in few European states. Nedergaard (2006) mentions that it is very diffi cult to change the structure of any kind of agricultural policy due to strong lobbying. The structure of quota holders has been interconnected; they cooperate together to preserve the current situation. Currently, only 21 companies/alliances are taking advantage of the quota regime. The top fi ve companies/alliances are operating as much as 70% of the production quota volume. These alliances are also operating over 75% of available production capacities (technological capacity). The EU sugar market has never been as highly concentrated as it is now. The number of small and independent players is constantly decreasing and the surviving giants are becoming more and more powerful. In 2017, a er the expected abolition of CMO related to sugar market -it is possible to expect even higher level of sugar market concentration especially because small sugar plants are expected to collapse. On the other hand, it is also possible to expect that the giant alliances will also start fi ghting with each other to gain control over the EU sugar market.
